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county and with which they were familiar, this in itself might negative
the idea of any criminal purpose in their actions."
This departure from orthodox law was inevitable in view of the doctrine laid

down as to motive since it is just such evidence as this that establishes defendant's motive. Just how far the court will go in applying the doctrine it is
difficult to estimate. The cases in regard to the element of malice in malicious
prosecution supply a close analogy to the problem involved.41
A. H. Aston.

ENTRAPMENT BY PUBLIC OFFICERS AS A DEFENSE
AGAINST CRIMINAL PROSECUTION
Entrapment has been defined as "The conception and planning of an
offense by an officer, and his procurement of its commission by one who would
not have perpetrated it except for the trickery, persuasion or fraud of the
officer."
In considering the availability of entrapment as a defense against criminal
prosecution the basic principle to be kept in mind is that the doctrine rests
upon the clear distinction between inducing a person to do an unlawful act
and setting a trap to catch him in the execution of criminal designs of his own
conception. The courts have long made allowance for the frailty of man when exposed to temptation by making available the defense of entrapment, but there
have been wide variations in the extent and application of the doctrine in
various jurisdictions. Before the recent United States Supreme Court case of
Sorrells v. U. S.3 the various Federal courts seemed to have had two distinct
conceptions of the defense.

One of these was best expressed in the case of U. S. v.Healy,4 in which
the court held: "It will be observed that the case at bar is not one of those
where the actor knows his act violates the law. Of the latter is he who, on
solicitation, sells or passes money known to him to be counterfeit, or he who
thus mails prohibited matter, or he who thus sells intoxicants without a license
or in dry territory. These latter acts are criminal, let the status of the
solicitor be what it may; and hence that he is a decoy does not neutralize the
criminal quality of the act." This case involved the violation of a federal statute
4"See cases cited in note 25 ante.
'From the concurring opinion of Justice Roberts in Sorrells v. U. S., 53 Supreme Court

Reporter 210.
216 C. 1. 88; 8 R. C. L. 128; 12 Cyc. 160.
353 Supreme Court Reporter 210.
'202 Fed. 349.
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prohibiting the sale of liquor to Indians. The defendant was not aware that
he was violating the statute because the detectives had disguised an Indian as
a Mexican in order to trap him in breaking the law.'
The other view of entrapment, and the one more often followed by the
Federal courts, is best expressed in Butts v. U. S.' Here the defendant was
indicted for the unlawful sale of morphine. He was not and never had been
a dealer in the drug. *He was induced by a friend who knew he had become
addicted to the drug when in pain caused by a long standing disease, to procure a quantity for him. This was all a device of the internal revenue agents
to trap the defendant. The court held: "But when the accused had never
committed such an offense as that charged against him prior to the time when
he is charged with the offense prosecuted, and never conceived any intention
of committing the offense prosecuted, or any such offense, and had not the
means to do so, the fact that the officers of the government incited and by
persuasion and representation lured him to commit the offense charged, in
order to entrap, arrest and prosecute him therefor, is and ought to be fatal
to the prosecution." 7
In the Sorrells case the federal view of the defense has at la-t b-,-n definitely fixed. The court, after mentioning both conceptions, held that the
limits of the defense of entrapment are not those expressed in the Healy case
and adopted the other view. The court also settled the question as to the
reasons for the defense, and its effect when available. Sorrells had been persuaded to procure liquor for a detective who was visiting his home, posing as
a tourist. There was no evidence that the defendant had ever sold or
possessed liquor before. The defendant, indicted for violation of the Prohibition Act, pleaded not guilty, and it was maintained that he could not afterward rely upon entrapment as a defense. The court decided that the defense
of entrapment could be raised after a plea of not guilty, saying: "We are
unable to conclude that it was the intention of Congress in enacting this statute
that its processes of detection and enforcement should be abused by the instigation by government officials of an act on the part of persons otherwise
innocent in order to lure them to its commission and punish them. * * * *
If the requirements of the highest public policy in the maintenance of the integrity of administration would preclude the enforcement of the statute in
such circumstances as are present here, the same considerations justify the
conclusion that the case lies outside the purview of the Act and that its general
words should not be construed to demand a proceeding at once inconsistent
with that policy and abhorrent to the sense of justice."
"The defense of entrapment is available, not in the view that the accused,
"See also Voves v. U. S., 249 Fed. 191.
6273 Fed. 35.
,See also Peterson v. U. S., 255 Fed. 433; U. S. v. Echols, 253 Fed. 862: Sam Yick v. 11.
S., 240 Fed. 60; Woo Wai et al. v. U. S-, 223 Fed. 412.
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though guilty, may go free, but that the government cannot be permitted to
contend that he is guilty of a serious crime where the government officials are
the instigators of his conduct.' '8
As to the effect that pleading entrapment may have on the introduction
of evidence the court said: "If the defendant seeks an acquittal by reason of
entrapment he cannot complain of an appropriate and searching inquiry into
his own conduct and pre-disposition as bearing upon the issue. If in consequence he suffers a disadvantage, he has brought it upon himself by reason of
the nature of his defense."
Before taking up the Pennsylvania view of entrapment it might be well
to consider, that in crimes against persons or property, though the defense of
entrapment is available, however it may be limited in a particular jurisdiction,
it may also be necessary to inquire whether or not the acts of the entrappers
amount to consent or cause the absence of certain physical conditions necessary to the crime. However, strictly speaking, this is not a question of entrapment at all, but merely a determination as to whether all the essential
elements of the crime charged are present.9
In Pennsylvania the position taken by the courts concerning entrapment
is very uncertain.- There have been comparatively few cases in which the
defense was raised, and many of the references to it which have appeared are
merely dicta. The conflicting and indefinite views found in the Pennsylvania
cases on this subject are ample evidence that this phase of the criminal law is
yet in its formative stage; which is true in all jurisdictions. It is to be hoped
that the decision in the Sorrells case will serve as the much needed foundation
and guide for the unification and extension of the rules concerning entrapment. The fundamental requisite of the defense, instigation by public officers
of a crime which the victim would not otherwise have committed, is, with
slight modifications, generally recognized, and now that the Supreme Court
has given this requisite definite expression and explained the reasons behind
the defense and its effect when raised, the groundwork is laid for clarification
:Justice Roberts. in his concurring opinion, stated that the proper justification of the defense was not that the entrapped offender was beyond the purview of the statute in question,
but that, following a principle of the civil courts, the criminal courts will not tolerate the use
of their process to consummate a wrong. This seems to be a more logical justification of the
defense, inasmuch as it covers both common law and statutory crimes, and it makes the defense a matter to be dealt with by the court at whatever stage of the proceedings it may see
fit, rather than an issue for determination by the jury.
See O'Brien v. U. S. for a discussion of entrapment as a form of estoppel. 51 Fed. (2nd)
674.
9
See 18 A, L. R. 146 and 66 A. L. R. 478 for an exhaustive list of cases involving this
question.
0It has always been the law in Pennsylvania that the mere fact that officers afforded an
opportunity for committing a crime cannot be used as a defense. Campbell v. Comm., 84 Pa.
187; Comm. v. Seybert. 4 Pa. Co. Ct. 152; Comm. v. Hollister, 157 Pa. 13: Comm. v. Dougherty, 37 Pa. Co. Ct. 62; Comm. v. Earl, 91 Pa. Super. Ct. 447; Comm. v. Johnson. 312 Pa. 140.
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of the remaining uncertainties."
The Pennsylvania courts, along with many others, have been careless in
distinguishing between traps set by private individuals and traps set by public
officers. Obviously it should be no defense that the offender was persuaded
to commit the crime in question by a private individual. 12 It is a very difficult
question and one which has not yet been satisfactorily answered, as to where
to draw the line of division between situations involving traps set by private
individuals and those involving public officers.
Cases in which the public officials have acted alone in setting the trap do
not present much difficulty since all that is necessary is to determine whether
their acts constitute a defense according to the requisites laid down in that
particular jurisdiction. However, the problem becomes much more involved
in situations such as those in which the trap is set by private detectives or
when one of a band of criminals turns informer and the public officials do little
more than apprehend the criminals. The courts do not seem to have expressed any definite rules as to what portion of the acts of setting the trap
must have been done by public officers or as to what persons may be considered public officers in order to open the door for the application of the principles of the availability of entrapment as a defense.
In light of this it may be found helpful in attempting to reconcile the Pennsylvania cases to keep in mind that there are really two separate questions
concerning the defense. First, in what capacity must the entrappers have
been acting in order to permit the defense to be raised; and second, if the
situation is one in which the defense may be resorted to, what conduct on the
part of the entrappers is required to make it effective?
In the case of Comm. v. Bickings,1 3 often cited as a Pennsylvania authority upon entrapment, the defendant was indicted for subornation of perjury.
He had been involved in some litigation with his brother, during which it became necessary to prove some facts by a certain witness. The defendant's
brother arranged with this witness to throw himself in the defendant's way,
and as a result the defendant seized the opportunity which presented itself
"In Meyer v. U. S., 67 Fed. (2nd) 223, the decision of the Sorrells case is followed in
determining that the judge in the lower court did not err in refusing to direct a verdict for the
defendant on the ground of entrapment.
"People v. Bock, 125 N. Y. Supp. 301. "Even though Adamski went farther than laying a trap, and actually solicited the defendants to commit the crime, it would furnish no
defense to them, since Adamski was not a prosecuting or other public official of any kind."
Wharton's Criminal Law, 9th. ed. Sec. 149. "'When the decoy ceases to be a detective and
becomes the originator of the crime, then one of two consequences follows. If he was not employed by the government then he becomes a co-conspirator liable to the same punishment as
If, on the other hand, he was employed by the government to cause
*
his associates.
the offense to be committed, the government is precluded from asking that the offenders thus
decoyed should be convicted." See also Hazen v. Comm., 23 Pa. 355 and Comm. v. Leeds,
Sheriff. 9 Phila. 569, holding that a conspiracy by private individuals to entrap is indictable.
-812 Pa. Dist. 206.
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and gave the witness a statement of facts to be testified to and a sum of
money. This all appeared to have been a trap so to discredit the defendant
in the- civil proceedings as to compel him to abate all or a part of his claim.
The defendant was acquitted after raising the defense of entrapment, the court
saying: "The liability of men to fall into crime by consulting their interests
and passions is unfortunately great, without the stimulation of encouragement.
No state, therefore, can safely adopt a policy by which crime is to be artificially propogated. This principle it is which leads to the limitations of the
doctrine as laid down by Wharton, namely that the defendant who is trapped
must himself have previously intended the offense into which he is trapped,
and also that the offense is one to be committed by himself, alone or with
others." The court then goes on to say that unless these conditions are present
" Such a proceeding is not a reality, but merely a tragical farce. in which the
detective masquerading as a criminal, captivates the unsophisticated defendant and then, with mock heroics, denounces him."
Behind this rather flowery language the opinion seems to have expressed
what is generally considered to be the basic test as to the availability of the
defense of entrapment, the absence of criminal designs of the defendant's own
conception. However, this case cannot be accepted as an authority for it
clearly presents an example of a trap set by a private individual. The court
evidently failed to make the distinction between public officers and private
individuals for the section of Wharton's Criminal Law cited in support of the
decision concerned entrapment by public officers.
What seems to be regarded as the leading Pennsylvania case on the
subject is Comm. v. Wasson.14 In this case detectives employed by a voters'
league approached three members of the city council of Pittsburgh and induced
them by promises of bribes to them and other councilmen to join in a conspiracy to get legislation passed which would create a market for wood paving blocks sold by a company for which the detectives claimed to be representatives. It was held that entrapment was no defense in this situation, and
the court's conception of the requisites of the defense was expressed as follows: "Again, in considering the question of public policy the clear distinction, founded upon principle as well as authority, is to be observed between
measures used to entrap a person into a crime in order, by making him a
criminal, to aid the instigator in the accomplishment of some corrupt private
purpose of his own, and artifice used to detect persons suspected of being engaged in criminal practices, particularly if such criminal practices vitally affect the public welfare, rather than individuals."
This decision seems to be in accord with the weight of authority as to
what conduct on the part of those setting the trap will not constitute a defense,
but its statement as to when the acts of the entrappers are of such a nature as to
bar prosecution does not seem to be very satisfactory. By its language it
1412 Pa. Super, Ct. 38.
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makes the test of availability not only whether the entrapper instigated the
commission of a crime which the defendant would not otherwise have committed, but also whether the entrapper did so to accomplish some corrupt
private purpose of his own. It is evident that situations of this sort are
relatively few and so to restrict the defense of entrapment would in large
measure defeat the very purpose for which it was developed.
It is interesting to note that the trap in this case was set by private
detectives. Whether the court here, too, failed to make the distinction mentioned above or whether it regarded 'private detectives in the same status as
public officers is problematical.1
In the case of Comm. v. Brown 16 the court citing the Wasson case, approved the charge of the lower court to the effect " * * * * that if this
was the only offense that has been pro;'en by the Commonwealth against the
defendant in this case and that these men induced him at that time to do a
thing which he would not have done except for their inducement
that he was an innocent man and that they laid a trap for him for the purpose
of convicting him * * * * the defendant ought not to be convicted." In
this case the defendant was indicted for pandering, and here again the trap
was set by private individuals.
In Comm. v. Wright7 the court again cites the Wasson case and says:
"If it had appeared that the offense had originated in the minds of the state
police and that the idea of its commission had by them been suggested or
transferred to the appellants, who until then had been innocent of it, and that
but for the suggestion or instigation the thought of the crime would not have
occurred to the appellants, then there might be some basis for the contention
(entrapment, instigation) but on evidence referred to there is no foundation
for that contention."
Regarding these cases as a group it is evident that they present but
meagre authority for answering either of the two questions mentioned above.
The defense has been considered in cases where the entrapment was the act
of public officers, *private detectives, and private individuals. It does not
seem likely that any court could have intended to extend the type of situation
in which the defense might be available so far as to include entrapment by
mere private individuals and the only explanation seems to be the failure to
make the distinction between them and public officers. However, it may well
be argued that such an explanation is mere rationalization and that by the
actual words of the cases the defense is available in cases of entrapment by
private individuals.
As to the requisites of the defense, whatever the limits may be as to the
l5That entrapment is an available defense in such cases see State v. Feldman. 129 S. W.

998; and Koscak v. State, 152 N, W. 181.
1654 Pa. Super. Ct. 439.
1785 Pa. Super. Ct. 412.
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situations in which it is permitted, it seems safe to say that they are essentially
the same as those stated in the Sorrells case. True. the Wasson case apparently injects a corrupt private motive on the part of the entrapper as an additional requisite. but this was completely ignored in the references to entrapment in the cases which followed it.
Oftentimes when a case involves the defense of entrapment, the parallel
question is raised as to the status of the entrappers, the contention being
made that when they instigate the act or aid in its commission, they are
equally guilty with the defendant. - The Pennsylvania doctrine on this point
seems to be unequivocal. In the leading case of Campbell v. Comm."9 it is
stated as follows: ...
.*. if he intended and continued in that intention from the time he came into the coal regions as a detective, to ferret out
and make known the crimes and secret frauds of such others, in order to
effect their arrest and punishment, then he is not to be regarded as an accessory before the fact." This case has been cited and followed in Comm. v.
Wasson, Comm. v,Earl,-'2 Comm. v.Smith,21 and Comm. v. Hollister.22
W. H. Wood.

RISK OF LOSS DUE TO FORGERY OF DRAWER'S SIGNATURE ON
A BILL OF EXCHANGE OR CHECK-THE OPERATION OF
THE DOCTRINE OF PRICE v. NEAL IN PENNSYLVANIA
In 1762 Lord Mansfield, in the famous case of Price v. Neal," decided
that the drawee of a bill of exchange is bound to know the drawer's signature,
and if the drawee pays a bill on which the drawer's signature is forged, he
cannot recover back from a holder the amount paid. This doctrine constitutes a well recognized.exception to the rule that money paid under mistake
of fact can be recovered. The case leading to the adoption of this rule in
America was the Pennsylvania case of Levy v. The Bank.2 In the many
states in this country in which the question arose prior to the adoption of the
Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law, the rule of Price v. Neal was adopted. 3
181t has been ruggested that entrapment by public officers should be a punishable offense
on their part. 29 11. L. Rev.100.

1984 Pa. 187.
2091 Pa. Super. Ct. 447.
2189 Pa. Super. Ct. 190.
22157 Pa. 13.
13 Burr. 1354, 97 Eng. Repr. 871; 1 W. Bl. 390, 96 Eng. Repr. 221.
21 Binn. (Pa.) 37 (1802).
sCases collected in 3 R. C. L: 615; 7 C. J. 688; 12 A. L. R. 1089, 71 A. L. R. 337; Brannan's Negotiable Instruments Law (5th), 615; Morse on Banks and Banking, See. 463 et seq.,
Woodward on Quasi-Contracts, Sec. 80.

